A Tucson municipal court judge erred in ordering a jury trial for a juvenile charged with two misdemeanor traffic offenses, the Supreme Court ruled 5-0 on March 23.

Juvenile courts have jurisdiction over all delinquency proceedings involving allegations of offenses listed in ARS 8-323(B) – essentially, any provision under Title 28 of Arizona Revised Statutes that is “not declared to be a felony.”

The decision arose out of the arrest two years ago of a 14-year-old, identified only as “David G.,” who led Tucson police on a high-speed chase through the city. Prosecutors initially were unaware the suspect was a juvenile, and sought jail time for him.

David G. was cited for several traffic violations and charged with two criminal offenses – reckless driving and leaving the scene of an accident. Prosecutors then withdrew its request for jail time when they learned that David G. was only 14.

Despite the action of the Pima County Attorney’s Office, City Court Magistrate Michael Pollard ordered a jury trial, ruling, in part that “the Rules of Criminal Procedure in so far as they do not conflict with the Rules of Juvenile Procedure guarantee the protection of due process rights.”

Writing for the unanimous court, Justice Michael D. Ryan stated: “…We disagree with the state’s assertion that a jury trial provides more protection for the due process rights of the juvenile than does an adjudication before a judge. Forcing a juvenile to be tried by a jury for the offenses for which David was cited does not promote the informality and flexibility that the juvenile courts strive to achieve…”

The opinion ordered Judge Pollard to vacate the convictions against the juvenile.

Length Of Probation Limited By Statute, Appeals Court States

A defendant cannot be placed on lifetime probation for the conviction of public sexual indecency, a misdemeanor, a three-judge panel of the state Court of Appeals has ruled.

In a 3-0 opinion filed March 18, the panel ruled that ARS 13-902 sets the maximum probationary period for any misdemeanor offense at three years.

Troy Steven Jackson entered a plea agreement in October 2000 in which he pleaded guilty to one count of public sexual indecency in exchange for dropping three other counts on the same charge, plus one count each of indecent exposure and public sexual indecency to a minor. Under the terms of the agreement, Jackson was placed on lifetime probation after serving 12 consecutive weekends of jail time.

Attorneys for Jackson filed a motion to end the probation after three years, relying on ARS 13-902, which Maricopa County Superior Court Judge Barry C. Schneider denied.

Prosecutors in the case acknowledged in briefs with the Appeals Court that they made the plea agreement in error, and argued that the plea agreement, in effect, had never existed. But writing for the panel, Judge William F. Garbarino stated: “…The state cannot now withdraw from the plea agreement relying on a mistake of law. The defendant, although reaping a benefit from the state’s failure to stay abreast of its statutes, cannot be said to have taken advantage of an unknowing adversary. After all, it is the state that is in the best position to know the law.” Presiding Judge Ann A. Scott Timmer and Judge Philip Hall concurred in the opinion.

Restitution Includes Costs Of Attending Trial, Judges Rule

Travel-related expenses incurred by a family member of a victim of a crime to attend the defendant’s trial constitute an “economic loss” for which the family member is entitled to receive restitution, the state Court of Appeals has affirmed.

In a 3-0 ruling, the three-judge panel denied an appeal from Tomas Shane Madrid, who argued that the three children of a woman he was convicted of murdering were not entitled to receive restitution for the costs of attending the trial because their presence was “voluntary.” Madrid also argued that he shouldn’t have to pay $5,357.32 restitution to the Yavapai County Attorney’s Office for disbursements it made to the victim’s children to attend the trial.

The Court of Appeals, though, decided that the expenses fit the definition of “economic loss” as defined under ARS 13-105(14), which refers to “any loss incurred by a person as a result of the commission of an offense. Economic loss includes lost interest, lost earnings and other losses which would not have been incurred but for the offense.” —